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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FOREIGN AFFAIRS ORIGINALISM IN YOUNGSTOWN’S SHADOW

STEPHEN I. VLADECK*

I
It is always a daunting task to write a response devoted entirely to an
individual article. It is that much heavier a burden when the article is as
thoughtful, careful, and, in the end, self-reflective as Professor Wuerth’s
contribution to this Symposium.1
The central thesis of Professor Wuerth’s article, as I take it, is that
“originalism,” under a number of different conceptualizations, is an “awkward
fit” in the field of foreign affairs. In one sense, as Professor Wuerth suggests,
originalism fails to answer many of the central questions of foreign affairs
scholarship.2 In another sense, certain foreign affairs questions may, in her
words, “undermine the positive case for originalism.”3 Either way, Professor
Wuerth concludes, originalists should pay more attention to foreign affairs, and
foreign affairs scholars should pay more attention to the competing
methodologies of contemporary constitutional interpretation.4 There is always
more, it seems, for us to do—and that is hardly a sentiment with which I can
take serious issue, even if it encourages lawyers (or, even worse, law

* Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law. This response was
prepared in conjunction with the Saint Louis University Law Journal’s March 2008 symposium
on “The Use and Misuse of History in U.S. Foreign Relations Law,” for my participation in
which I owe thanks to David Sloss. Thanks also to Christy Abbott, Thomas Harvey, Taylor
Matthews, and the rest of the Saint Louis University Law Journal staff for their skilled editing
and, as importantly, their patience.
By way of disclosure, I should note that I have played a recurring role on the legal team
for the petitioner in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Needless to say, the opinions
expressed herein are mine alone, and do not in any way represent the position of Hamdan or his
counsel.
1. Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs?, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 5 (2008).
2. Id. at 6–7, 27.
3. Id. at 8.
4. Id. at 7–8.
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professors) to play historians, a role to which we are not particularly wellsuited.5
Rather than take up Professor Wuerth’s thesis on its terms, in this short
response, I want to focus on foreign affairs originalism and the courts,
notwithstanding Professor Wuerth’s quite accurate observation that a good deal
of constitutional interpretation vis-à-vis foreign affairs takes place outside the
courtroom.6 To be sure, my interest in this particular topic is partly selfish—
my own research and writing tends to focus more on the courts and on
constitutional doctrine than it does on questions of theory or interpretive
method.
But it also cannot be gainsaid that one of the most powerful places in
which questions about the scope of the President’s “foreign affairs” powers
arise is in lawsuits seeking to resolve conflicts between the President’s claim
of authority on the one hand, and the power of some other actor, be it Congress
or the states, on the other. If ever there are to be definitive answers concerning
how the Constitution allocates authority concerning foreign affairs, the courts
will, presumably, have at least some significant role to play in providing them.
In that instance, the question I want to ask (and hopefully answer) in the pages
that follow is whether Professor Wuerth’s careful analysis might actually make
a difference. Put another way, is there a there, there?
I suspect that one could easily take from Professor Wuerth’s article the
sentiment that originalism is, ultimately, of exceedingly little help to
contemporary courts in resolving serious and difficult foreign affairs questions,
especially in the context of conflicts between the Legislative and Executive
Branches. But my thesis is that the real culprit behind this difficulty is neither
originalism as an interpretive method nor foreign affairs as a body of
constitutional law.
Rather, the reason why the case for foreign affairs originalism may
ultimately be so unconvincing is the movement toward functionalism as a
means of resolving separation-of-powers conflicts, particularly in cases
implicating foreign affairs. Thus, whatever may be said about the suitability or
theoretical utility of originalism generally, or in the field of foreign affairs
specifically, it is hard to square any case for foreign affairs originalism with
the methodological framework at the heart of the Supreme Court’s
contemporary separation-of-powers jurisprudence.

5. For the classic critique of “law-office history,” see Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court:
An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119. See also Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in
Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995).
6. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 6.
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That analytical framework, of course, finds its origins in Justice Jackson’s
concurring opinion in Youngstown,7 and his famous trifurcated taxonomical
approach to resolving separation-of-powers conflicts.8 Thus, I begin in Part II
with the competing approaches to the legal issue in Youngstown, and the extent
to which originalism did—and did not—factor into the analysis of the six
Justices in the majority, especially that of Justice Jackson in his celebrated
concurrence.
As Part II explains (and as others have previously noted), there is an
inherent incongruity between Jackson’s separation-of-powers functionalism
and foreign affairs originalism. Indeed, this incongruity does not just bear out
Professor Flaherty’s observation that Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown is
“among the most anti-originalist opinions in the modern canon.”9 Rather, it
demonstrates how, in Youngstown’s shadow, there is exceedingly little room
for foreign affairs originalism in any form.10
In Part III, I turn to a pair of recent (and significant) Supreme Court
decisions invoking Jackson’s analysis—Hamdan11 and Medellin.12 As I’ve
suggested previously, at least in regard to Hamdan, there are elements of the
Court’s analysis that suggest a step back from the analytical looseness of
Jackson’s framework.13 Read alongside Professor Wuerth’s article, perhaps
these cases further suggest that there is a future for foreign affairs originalism,
and one that might provide a sounder platform from which to reconceptualize
the fundamental separation-of-powers problem at the heart of Youngstown.
II
Youngstown, of course, was a mess of a case.14 The six Justices in the
majority—Black, Burton, Clark, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson—each
offered their own opinion explaining why President Truman’s extra-legislative

7. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
8. Id. at 635–38.
9. Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 172 (2004).
10. To be clear, my goal is not to critique functionalism in general, or Jacksonian
functionalism in particular. Rather, I mean only to demonstrate how Justice Jackson’s
Youngstown framework is starkly anti-originalist, and how, as a result, the two interpretive
approaches cannot coexist.
11. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
12. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
13. Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Separation of Powers
After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 960–61 (2007).
14. For what remains one of the best overall treatments of the decision, see MAEVA
MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
(1977).
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seizure of the steel mills was unconstitutional.15 Justice Black delivered the
opinion of the Court, offering a rationale that is usually described as
“formalistic”16—relying on the conclusion that the Constitution confers no
legislative power upon the Executive, and that Truman was “legislating” by
seizing the steel mills.17 Justice Douglas echoed Black’s majority opinion,
concluding that “[w]e could not sanction the seizures and condemnations of the
steel plants in this case without reading Article II as giving the President not
only the power to execute the laws but to make some.”18
To similar (but perhaps not quite as stark) effect, Justices Burton and Clark
focused on the significance of congressional action in displacing a power that
the President might otherwise possess. Justice Burton thus emphasized
Congress’s omission of such seizure authority in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act,19
concluding that “[t]he controlling fact here is that Congress, within its
constitutionally delegated power, has prescribed for the President specific
procedures, exclusive of seizure, for his use in meeting the present type of
emergency.”20
Justice Clark similarly invoked the Taft-Hartley Act, along with the
Defense Production Act of 195021 and the Selective Service Act of 1948,22 as
providing procedures for the resolution of labor disputes such as that which
prompted Truman’s seizure. In his words, “neither the Defense Production Act
nor Taft-Hartley authorized the seizure challenged here, and the Government
made no effort to comply with the procedures established by the Selective
Service Act of 1948, a statute which expressly authorizes seizures when
producers fail to supply necessary defense matériel.”23
The two remaining Justices in the majority, Frankfurter and Jackson, were
less convinced that the case could be resolved simply on the ground that
Truman’s actions were wanting for congressional authorization.
For
Frankfurter, the issue was one of historical practice. After extensively
summarizing prior congressional actions, Frankfurter analyzed the significance
of the omission of seizure authority in Taft-Hartley by reference to precedent:

15. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
16. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J.
408, 442 & n.168 (2007).
17. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585–89.
18. Id. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring).
19. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
20. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 660 (Burton, J., concurring).
21. Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798 (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061–2171 (2000)).
22. Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, 62 Stat. 604 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451–471a (2000)).
23. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 665–66 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment).
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In formulating legislation for dealing with industrial conflicts, Congress could
not more clearly and emphatically have withheld authority than it did in 1947.
Perhaps as much so as is true of any piece of modern legislation, Congress
acted with full consciousness of what it was doing and in the light of much
recent history. Previous seizure legislation had subjected the powers granted
to the President to restrictions of varying degrees of stringency. Instead of
giving him even limited powers, Congress in 1947 deemed it wise to require
the President, upon failure of attempts to reach a voluntary settlement, to report
to Congress if he deemed the power of seizure a needed shot for his locker.
The President could not ignore the specific limitations of prior seizure statutes.
No more could he act in disregard of the limitation put upon seizure by the
24
1947 Act.

In other words, in Frankfurter’s view, the significance of the Taft-Hartley
Act’s omission of presidential seizure authority could be judged only by
reference to prior practice, and not simply by reference to whether the measure
was within Congress’s constitutional authority in the first place.
Finally, and most famously, came the concurring opinion of Justice
Jackson. That Jackson eschewed any “originalist” view of the separation of
powers was clear from the outset:
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they
foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as
enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A
century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net
result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on
25
each side of any question. They largely cancel each other.

Thus, several pages before Jackson enunciated his tripartite taxonomy for
resolving separation-of-powers disputes, he affirmatively disclaimed the utility
of originalism as an aid to his efforts. Instead, as he put it, “The actual art of
governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial
definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or
even single Articles torn from context.”26 Perhaps as a response to
Frankfurter’s detailed summary of historical practice, Jackson argued that prior
precedents did not resolve the issue one way or the other. Rather, “[w]e may
well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in
which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, and by
distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of relativity.”27

24. Id. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 634–35 (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson appended a footnote to the same
passage, suggesting with more than a hint of sarcasm that “[a] Hamilton may be matched against
a Madison. Professor Taft is counterbalanced by Theodore Roosevelt. It even seems that
President Taft cancels out Professor Taft.” Id. at 635 n.1 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 635.
27. Id.
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Jackson then introduced his three groupings of “practical situations”: (1)
where the President acts with congressional authorization; (2) where “the
President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority”;
or (3) where the President acts in the face of either the expressed or implied
In the first category, “[i]f his act is held
will of Congress.28
unconstitutional . . . it usually means that the Federal Government as an
undivided whole lacks power.”29 In the second category,
[T]here is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
30
theories of law.

Finally, in category three, where the President’s power “is at its lowest ebb,”
Jackson’s opinion suggested that “[c]ourts can sustain exclusive Presidential
control . . . only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.”31
What is ironic about Jackson’s opinion, of course, is that it solves
practically nothing. Even under Jackson’s trifurcation, the President can lose
in category one, he can win in category three, and one is left to wonder just
what category two means by “contemporary imponderables.” Indeed, and
perhaps most importantly, Jackson’s opinion does little to elucidate those
circumstances in which Congress can be “disabled” from placing limitations
on presidential power, opening the door to decades of (seemingly unending)
academic debate.32
In rejecting the approach of his concurring brethren, Jackson implicitly
suggested that there were other considerations at stake, considerations having
excessively little to do with “original” understanding. The softness of
Jackson’s three categories thus seems exceedingly difficult to reconcile with
clear and categorical answers as to the Constitution’s allocation of foreign
affairs power.
As Professor Ramsey has explained, it is not just that the framework seems
difficult to reconcile with contemporary categorical answers. Instead,
“[n]either Jackson nor Frankfurter . . . grappled with how the Constitution’s

28. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 636–37.
30. Id. at 637.
31. Id. at 637–38.
32. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the
Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV.
689 (2008); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008).
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text originally allocated foreign affairs power. Like much modern scholarship,
they assumed that the Constitution was incomplete on key foreign affairs
matters, and that gaps would be filled in other ways . . . .”33 And while that
assumption would not necessarily be fatal to foreign affairs originalism in the
abstract, Jackson championed a framework that did not really allow for filling
the gaps with originalism, whether in the form of original public meaning,
original legal meaning, or any other iteration thereof.
Of course, Jackson’s concurrence was just one of six opinions. But his
opinion was later effectively adopted by the Supreme Court in Dames &
Moore v. Regan, where then-Justice Rehnquist described Jackson’s framework
as “analytically useful.”34 Just last Term, Chief Justice Roberts described it as
“the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area.”35 Thus,
the methodology adopted by the Supreme Court to resolve separation-ofpowers conflicts, particularly in cases implicating “foreign affairs,” was one
hostile to originalism in both its conceptualization and its implementation.
III
Fast-forward to 2006, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan.36 At
issue was the legality of military commissions established by President Bush
pursuant solely to a November 2001 executive order.37 And although the bulk
of Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion (and Justice Kennedy’s partial
concurrence) focused on questions of statutory interpretation, the constitutional
imperative bolstering the statutory analysis unmistakably came from
Youngstown. In the critical passage of Justice Stevens’s opinion, for example,
the Court emphasized why the central question was whether the commissions
established by President Bush comported with the substantive and procedural
requirements of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)38—an Act of
Congress: “Whether or not the President has independent power, absent
congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war
powers, placed on his powers.”39
What is fascinating about this passage, as I’ve noted previously, is that it
cites Jackson’s framework from Youngstown even while skipping a critical
33. MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 53 (2007).
34. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).
35. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008).
36. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
37. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006)
(notes).
38. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006).
39. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 n.23 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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step—Hamdan simply asserts that Congress has constitutionally interposed
limitations on the President’s powers, even though Jackson suggested that
there would be circumstances where it might be “disabled” from doing so, and
even though the Bush Administration had argued that this was one such
In the process, Hamdan assumed that the relevant
circumstance.40
constitutional power was conferred upon Congress, without ever getting into
the trickier business of either identifying the particular legislative authority or
locating it textually.
A similarly cursory analysis of Youngstown can be found in last Term’s
decision in Medellin.41 There, in addition to holding that the International
Court of Justice’s Avena decision42 was not binding upon U.S. state courts,43
the Supreme Court also rejected the applicability of a memorandum issued by
President Bush that purported to command the state courts to comply with the
ICJ judgment.44
Specifically, in concluding that the President was without authority to
order compliance by the state courts, the Medellin majority first explained how
such power did not derive from U.S. treaty obligations,45 before also rejecting
the argument that the President’s foreign affairs power entitled him to so
provide.46 And in analyzing the President’s “foreign affairs” power, the
majority’s discussion was short and uncompromising:
The President’s Memorandum is not supported by a “particularly longstanding
practice” of congressional acquiescence, but rather is what the United States
itself has described as “unprecedented action.” Indeed, the Government has
not identified a single instance in which the President has attempted (or
Congress has acquiesced in) a Presidential directive issued to state courts,
much less one that reaches deep into the heart of the State’s police powers and
compels state courts to reopen final criminal judgments and set aside neutrally
47
applicable state laws.

Taking the absence of prior practice as affirmative evidence to the contrary, the
Medellin majority thus suggested a categorical preclusion of presidential power
in the field—at least absent some congressional quiescence.

40. See Vladeck, supra note 13, at 956–61 (explaining in more detail how Hamdan’s
analysis is inconsistent with Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence).
41. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
42. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
43. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1356–67.
44. Id. at 1371–72; Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to
Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html.
45. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1368–71.
46. Id. at 1371–72.
47. Id. at 1372 (citations omitted).
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My point is not to quibble with the analyses supplied by the Court in either
Hamdan or Medellin.48 At least on these points, I believe that the Court
reached the correct result on both occasions. But leaving my own thinking to
the side, the larger point here is that both of these opinions invoked Justice
Jackson’s framework, even while appearing to deviate from it—and in
Hamdan, substantially at that.
It is hard to know just what to take away from such a small data set. Is the
Court signaling a willingness to restore some degree of categorical formalism
to its consideration of the President’s foreign affairs powers? Is it simply
giving short-shrift to analytical steps that it very much intends to include in the
analysis? At best, the answer is unclear. But the more the Court suggests,
contrary to Justice Jackson, that some of these disputes do have clear and
categorical answers, the more I suspect there is room to reinvigorate an
originalist view of foreign affairs powers.49
IV
Suggestions in various opinions to the contrary notwithstanding,50 there is
nothing necessarily formalistic about separated powers—by which I mean
there is no constitutional requirement that the branches be hermetically
sealed.51 As Professor Rebecca Brown explained nearly two decades ago,
The best evidence that the Framers intended to reject a strict separation of
powers is that they created a system of checks and balances requiring
participation by each branch in some functions that may be considered part of
the power of the others—itself a violation of a pure theory of separated
powers. “Checks and balances do not arise from separation theory, but are at
odds with it. Checks and balances have to do with corrective invasion of the
separated powers.” It is worth remembering that the federalist defense of the
Constitution’s treatment of governmental structure focused not on the use of

48. For more on the fate of Jackson’s analysis in Hamdan and Medellin, see Michael J.
Turner, Comment, Fade to Black: The Formalization of Jackson’s Tripartite Taxonomy by
Hamdan and Medellin, 58 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
49. At least, in those cases where originalism provides answers. For example, in
Boumediene v Bush, 553 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), Justice Kennedy concluded that
Founding-era sources were simply unclear as to whether non-citizens outside the United States
would be protected by the writ of habeas corpus. See id. at 2248–51.
50. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that proper respect for the separation of powers requires recognizing that Article II’s
Vesting Clause “does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power”).
51. But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“Although not ‘hermetically’ sealed
from one another, the powers delegated to the three Branches are functionally identifiable.”
(citation omitted)).
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the separation device, but on the Constitution’s numerous deviations from the
52
pure separation model.

Power sharing among the branches is therefore inevitable, as are disputes over
where the line is between constitutionally appropriate checks and balances and
the unconstitutional arrogation of one branch’s prerogative by another.
For decades, we have assumed that the constitutional framework for
resolving such disputes is provided by Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in
Youngstown. For better or worse, though, Jackson’s framework marginalizes
originalism, suggesting that whatever we might learn by studying “originalist”
sources will be necessarily incomplete, regardless of the potential utility of
such knowledge. Writing a few years ago, Professor Flaherty poignantly
observed that “Jackson merely assumed history was invariably inconclusive,”53
without getting into the far more difficult and important work of proving as
much.
Although Flaherty himself argues that “a careful reconstruction of the
Founding era decisions tends to confirm [Jackson’s] assumption,”54 there are
others who would disagree, and who have suggested, especially as of late, that
at least some of the great questions concerning the allocation of constitutional
foreign affairs powers can be answered by reference to originalism.55 The
point of this response has not been to suggest that I side with one school over
the other in this debate—even though I do share much of Professor Flaherty’s
skepticism. For until and unless the Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers
jurisprudence begins to more powerfully reflect the idea that some of these
questions do have categorical answers—a point that is at best implicit in the
recent Hamdan and Medellin decisions—functionalism will remain the
methodological watchword, and originalism will remain the fodder for
interesting (but entirely academic) debates.

52. Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1531–32 (1991) (footnotes omitted) (quoting GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE
FEDERALIST 119 (1981)).
53. Flaherty, supra note 9, at 172 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., RAMSEY, supra note 33, at 53; see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE
PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (2002) (arguing that there are clear lines of demarcation between the
President’s foreign affairs powers and Congress’s authority in the field).

